Abstract| We formulate and solve a problem of allocating resources among competing services di erentiated by user tra c characteristics and maximum end-to-end delay. The solution leads to an alternative approach to service provisioning in an ATM network, in which the network o ers directly for rent its bandwidth and bu ers and users purchase freely resources to meet their desired quality. Users make their decisions based on their own tra c parameters and delay requirements and the network sets prices for those resources. The procedure is iterative in that the network periodically adjusts prices based on monitored user demand, and is decentralized in that only local information is needed for individual users to determine resource requests. We derive network's adjustment scheme and users' decision rule and establish their optimality. Since our approach does not require the network to know user tra c and delay parameters, it does not require tra c policing on the part of the network.
Introduction
In this paper, we study a di erent approach to provisioning services in an ATM network. A service is speci ed by a oneway connection (source, destination, route) and two sets of service parameters. A connection is used to transport a data stream or message from the source to the destination; the tra c parameters specify constraint on a user's trafc`burstiness'; the quality parameters specify maximum end-to-end delay and cell loss rate. 1 We assume that the network o ers for sale di erent types of services, di erentiated by the triplet (connection, tra c parameters, quality parameters), and that there is a ow, depending on the service cost, of user requests for these services. A service request is admitted if su cient resources can be allocated along the connection's route to guarantee service quality. By resources, we mean the bandwidth and bu ers in each node along the route. Before transmission, a message is segmented into small, xed size units called cells. The bandwidth and bu ers allocated to a connection can vary over links in its route. More speci cally, a network o ers a set S of services. A unit of type s service is provided by a type s connection with the associated tra c and quality parameters, and is sold for a unit price of w s . The network can produce any amount of type s service provided the required resources do not exceed capacity. Users request services to maximize their individual utilities subject to budget constraints, and the result of this maximization is summarized by an aggregate demand function D s (w s ). 2 Further assume that the network is regulated to charge its services so as to maximize a welfare function: A key observation is that bandwidth and bu ers are`substitutible resources' to meet a service quality (see below). In this paper, we exploit this tradeo of di erent resource combinations to optimize an overall measure of network performance. For each allocation indexed by , let W( ) denote the welfare achieved in (1) by an equilibrium price { supply vector (w( ); x( )). Our objective is to derive an iterative and decentralized algorithm that solves for a that meets service quality and maximizes W( ). The algorithm leads to our service provisioning procedure in which the network o ers directly for rent its bandwidth and bu ers, and the users purchase freely resources to meet its desired quality. A user bases its decision on the knowledge of its own tra c and quality parameters, and on the resource price. The network periodically adjusts the prices based on the monitored user request for resources. Unlike the common price adjustment scheme based on the law of demand and supply, our scheme involves a minimization by the network. Furthermore, users of type s service effectively do two optimization in each period: one selects a resource combination along the route to minimize service cost w s ; the other selects a demand D s (w s ) that maxi-mizes surplus. It is decentralized in that each user only needs to know the resource price at nodes along its route in addition to its own tra c and quality parameters. The solution makes critical use of the bandwidth-bu er tradeo described by burstiness curve in 16, 17] : for the network, it determines the resource combination to maximize welfare; for individual users, it provides a simple rule for requesting resources (see (19) ).
Our approach di ers in three ways from the conventional service provisioning approach in which the network decides beforehand resources to be allocated to the users. First, under our approach, users freely rent resources and package them into services that best meet their needs. Second, since service price is the rent a user pays for the resources it reserves, our procedure ties this price to network performance measured by the welfare function. Third, since the network only guarantees the availability of purchased resources, it is the users' responsibility to shape their trafc in order that the allocated resources can provide the desired quality. Our approach relieves the network of the di cult task of tra c policing and enforcement and can potentially adapt to time-varying user needs expressed by the tra c and quality parameters.
Several sets of previous work are relevant here. In conventional packet-switched networks, bandwidth and bu ers are typically not reserved for connections but shared on an on-demand basis. Unrestricted sharing makes it di cult for the network to o er a guaranteed delay to a particular connection, since a more bursty connection can monopolize network resources to the detriment of other connections, possibly leading to congestion. As a consequence of the need to guarantee serviec quality in an ATM network, various bandwidth allocation schemes have recently been designed to guarantee certain amount of bandwidth to a connection despite changes in the number and burstiness of concurrent connections, e.g. 10, 25, 5, 20, 2, 7, 22] . This justi es our approximation of each network node as allocating a xed bandwidth to a connection. The next question is how much bandwidth to allocate to each connection. To secure service quality, a common proposal is to allocate to each connection enough bandwidth to accommodate its peak rate. This simple proposal leads to ine ciency if the peak rate is much larger than its average rate. This may be unnecessary if the tradeo between bandwidth and bu ers as substitutible resources for service provisioning can be exploited. A more sophisticated proposal is based on the notion of a connection's`equivalent bandwidth ' 13, 6, 14, 3] . 11, 12] study the e ect on some overall measure of network performance of varying resource capacities in the network and of varying routing. We vary the resource allocation to the connections rather than the resource capacity, exploiting the bandwidth-bu er tradeo . Multiple-service-multiple-resource model is also considered in 8]. There the resource allocation is xed, and the problem is to nd a revenue-maximizing admission control policy that may reject a request even when su cient resources are available in the hope of more pro table requests in the future. In the present formulation resources cannot be reserved in anticipation of future requests. Instead we explore alternative feasible allocations. Pricing has been used previously for control and optimization in communication networks, e.g. 4, 15] .
The tradeo between bandwidth and bu ers is easily illustrated. Consider the transfer over a single link of a sequence of video frames; see Figure 1 . Suppose a frame contains 512 512 8-bit pixels, and is generated at the video source every 33 msec. The service is to deliver a frame every 33 msec to the display. Suppose the source rate is m(t) as shown in the gure. If we allocate the peak rate 150
Mbps then the received rate is the same as m(t) (except for propagation and processing delay). An alternative is to allocate 65 Mbps and some bu ers to the connection; the received rate m 0 (t) is as shown. The alternative allocation achieves the same service as shown in the gure.
In x2, we introduce our network model and service parameters. In x3, we de ne optimality and formulate optimal allocation as a game problem. Its solution leads to our iterative and decentralized service provisioning procedure that does not require the network to know user tra c and quality parameters. Concluding remarks are collected in x4, and proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
While our argument is preliminary, it does suggest an alternative to the popular approach in which the network decides which services will best meet user needs. Here, the users decide the resources they need based on their own tra c and quality parameters, and the network coordinates their choices via resource pricing in order to optimize an overall measure of network performance.
Model
We consider a network with a set L of links. Link l 2 L comprises a transmission capacity of C l cells per second, or cps, and bu ers for B l cells, see Figure 2 . A set R of routes is speci ed; r 2 R also denotes the set of links along that route. The network o ers a set S of services. A unit of type s service is provided by a type s connection over route r s . It is sold at a price of w s per unit time 3 . Under our service provisioning scheme, this unit price w s is related to the cost of resources needed to provide the service, and is adjusted periodically to achieve an optimal allocation, as elaborated in x3. We 3 The price ws may be some ctitious currency for control purposes that the network can adjust at will. can be freely chosen provided the service quality constraint is met as explained next. A word is in order on how this tra c characterization may be used in practice. First, if the duration of a message is very long, e.g. a video program, we divide its duration into disjoint periods T i , i = 1; : : : ; k. A type s message is compliant if the portion of message on every period T i satis es (3-4) with T replaced by T i . (3) then guarantees that no cell backlog carries over to the next period. Second, we do not assume that a user of type s service knows its own message m(t) or the burstiness of m(t). We only assume that they know a bound b s ( );
, on the burstiness. In fact, condition (4) can be easily enforced by passing an arbitrary user message through a leaky bucket policing device before being admitted into the network. The two parameters of a leaky bucket (and the bound on peak message rate in each period) de ne a piecewise linear burstiness curve that bounds the burstiness of the output message from the leaky bucket 17, Proposition 3].
For the rest of this paper, we will use the following vec- To specify the quality of service, the maximum end-toend delay, we use two results from the theory of burstiness curve in 16, 18, 17] 
The conditions say that, in equilibrium, user demand is met and the network maximizes revenue. (7) is satis ed. We can restrict our search for a maximizer to the set f(x; w)jx s = D s (w s )g and consider the equivalent problem:
s (x s ) + 1) subject to equation (7) By the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, x( ) is a maximizer only if Also from Proposition 1, the maximum welfare is W( ) = X x s ( )+ < ( ); C > + < ( ); B > (13) Now suppose can be freely chosen. We can now formally de ne an optimal allocation.
De nition 2 An allocation is optimal, or welfare maximizing, if it maximizes the welfare W( ) in (13) .
To directly maximizing (13) the network needs to know user tra c and quality parameters (b s ; s ). We propose a di erent approach which does not require such knowledge, and hence does not require any tra c policing and enforcement on the part of the network, though users may still want to shape their messages to comply with (b s ; s ) so that the end-to-end delay is met. From (10-11) The following result is key to our solution. Note that G is convex in ( ; ) but not generally concave in .
Proposition 2 There exists a saddle-point ( ; ; ) to the max-min problem (14) that is welfare-maximizing, i.e. 
where we recall that s = f ls ; l 2 r s g. The proposition says that if player N chooses the minimizer ( ; ), then player U s will choose the optimal s since ( ; ; ) is a saddle point. Note again that and in (15) can be conveniently interpreted as the rent per unit time for one unit of bandwidth and bu er, respectively. Even though the minimizer ( ; ) for min ; G( ; ; ) may not be unique, it can be shown that the unit price w s = P l2rs ( l ls + l b s ( ls )) for type s service is the same regardless of which minimizer is used as resource price.
This interpretation suggests the following service provisioning procedure to reach ( ; ; (18) where T s is the duration of a type s connection. Users may rent any amounts of bandwidth ls s and bu ers b s ( ls ) at each link l 2 r s . We assume that, given prices ( ; ), users will try to minimize their expected service cost (18) , subject to their own quality requirement s s . That is, they will take on the role of U s in (15) . We let the network take on the role of N in (16) to calculate the price ( ; ). As noted above, if the network charges according to ( ; ), then users will indeed request the optimal allo- User algorithm:
In period n, 4 In charging a user the service cost (18), we implicitly assume that the user does not know the burstiness of its own message but only its bound bs that can be easily enforced by a leaky bucket. This does not lose generality, since if some of the users know a better bound, we may separate them into a di erent service type s 0 without changing the argument.
1. A user of type s service solves (using (19) Then any accumulation point of the sequence ( n , n+1 , n+1 ) is a saddle point of G.
The decentralized nature of the procedure is striking:
given the price ( ; ), the bandwidth and bu er request ( ls ; b s ( ls )) at link l of route r s that minimizes the service cost (18) ) is strictly decreasing and convex for ls < M, the optimal ls is unique for each ( ; ). Hence, in each period n, a user minimizes the expected cost (18) by requesting resources according to (19) ; and this computation can be done locally for each link along the route. By Theorem 1, the service provisioning procedure will achieve a welfare-maximizing allocation. The optimal price ( ; ) determines a minimum-cost allocation . ( ; ; ) yields the service price w and the amount x s = D s (w ) of service produced that form an equilibrium.
Conclusion
We have studied an alternative approach to service provisioning in an ATM network, which does not require the network to know user needs. In this approach, the network o ers directly for rent its bandwidth and bu ers and the users purchase them freely to meet their desired quality. The service provisioning procedure is based on a solution of the problem of allocating bandwidth and bu ers to meet several types of service requests, di erentiated by bounds on the average rate and burstiness of the message and on the end-to-end delay.
The model has one serious de ciency. Once network resources are allocated to a service request, those resources cannot be shared by other connections. Such`exclusion' is necessary since no cell loss is allowed. However, if one does permit cell loss (as a service quality parameter), then it is possible, indeed desirable, to share resources among concurrent connections, i.e. to permit statistical multiplexing. This will require an understanding of the interaction between resource allocations, cell loss, and delay. A preliminary attempt in this direction is reported in 23].
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
By the duality theorem of linear programming, (x s ( )) satis es (9) We now proceed to the proof of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1. Since G( ; ; ) is not concave in , we will use a generalization of von Neumann's minimax theorem due to Kakutani 9] .
Suppose that M s is the bound on the peak rate for a type s message, i. For each ( ; ), player U s 's optimal strategy R 1 ( ; ), given by (19) , is unique. For each , denote by R 2 ( ) the set of minimizers for (16) . Both R 1 and R 2 are nonempty. The convexity of G in ( ; ) implies that R 2 ( ) is convex for each .
Lemma 1 R 1 is continuous on S 2 . R 2 is upper semicontinuous on S 1 , i.e., if n ! , ( n ; n ) 2 R 2 ( n ) and ( n ; n ) ! ( ; ), then ( ; ) 2 R 2 ( ).
Proof. 2 We will prove that has a xed point using Kakutani's theorem 9] which states that, given a compact and convex set X, if f is an upper semicontinuous function which assigns to each x 2 X a closed and convex subset of X, then there exists some x 2 X such that x 2 f(x). Now S 1 S 2 is compact and convex, and by Lemma 1 is upper semi-continuous. ( ; ; ) = R 1 ( ; ) R 2 ( ) is convex since each component is. We only need to show that ( ; ; ) is closed. R 1 ( ; ) is a singleton and hence closed. The continuity of G implies that R 2 ( ) is closed. Hence ( ; ; ) is closed.
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